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1 Introduction 
While the dampening effect of borders on international trade has been widely documented, 
"border effects" have not yet been empirically quantified for the case of public procurement. 
This is surprising since in most industrialized countries public procurement accounts for a 
substantial share of GDP.
1
 Moreover, the detrimental welfare effects of border effects in the 
award of public contracts can be substantial, especially if they are due to a "home bias," i.e., a 
tendency of governments to award procurement contracts to domestic firms relative to 
foreign competitors.
2
 The liberalization of procurement practices, in particular, with the aim 
of increasing cross-border procurement, has therefore been on the agenda of policy makers 
for a long time.
3
  
In this paper we fill this gap in the literature by documenting and quantifying border effects 
in public procurement in the European Single Market. Our empirical analysis is based on 1.8 
million European public procurement contracts awarded from 2010 to 2014 and published in 
the EU’s Tenders Electronic Daily database (TED). We match geo-locations to the address 
information in the data and then assign Eurostat's NUTS3 regions to tenderers and winning 
bidders to create a data set that consists of 1,361 × 1,361 bilateral public procurement flows 
between NUTS3 region pairs. Following the seminal work of McCallum (1995), we then use 
this data set to estimate a gravity model of bilateral procurement flows with border effects.
4
  
Despite accounting for NUTS3 origin and destination fixed effects, geographic and cultural 
distance, and common currency and language, we document evidence of very substantial 
intra- and international border effects in European public procurement. We find the most 
sizable effect for cross-national borders: a local firm, that is, a firm located in the same 
NUTS3 region as the contracting authority, is more than 900 times more likely to be awarded 
a contract compared to a foreign firm. Cross-regional border effects within countries are 
quantitatively less important but still of substantial magnitude. A local firm is about twice as 
likely to win a contract compared to a firm located in a different NUTS3 within the same 
NUTS2 and over seven times more likely to win compared to a firm in the same country but 
in a different NUTS1 region 
Our results hold for goods, services, and construction procurement and for different types of 
public procurement procedures and award criteria. We also show that cultural differences 
across countries, to the degree to which they can be quantitatively captured, can only explain 
a relatively small part of the border effect. However, our findings point to a decrease of 
border effects over time during our sample period. 
We then try to better understand the underlying causes of border effects. Firstly, we find that 
international border effects are decreasing in the value of the public contract. This finding is 
consistent with the interpretation that foreign firms face a fixed cost to bid for public 
contracts tendered in other EU Member States. 
                                                 
1
 For example, the estimate of total general government public procurement expenditure, excluding utilities and 
defense, was 1931.5 billion euros in 2014, or about 13% of EU GDP (European Commission, 2016). 
2
 See, for example, Mattoo (1996) and Trionfetti (2000) for a discussion on the welfare effects in the case of 
discriminatory public procurement. 
3
 Early efforts to bring government procurement under internationally agreed trade rules were undertaken in the 
OECD framework. The matter was then brought into the Tokyo Round of Trade Negotiations within GATT in 
1976. The revised GPA entered into force on 6 April 2014. More recently, tackling the barriers to cross-border 
procurement has again been identified as a policy priority in a very recent Commission Staff Working 
Document (accessible at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015SC0202). 
4
 See Head and Mayer (2014) for a review on the border effect and the gravity equation in international trade. 
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Secondly, we try to understand whether border effects arise exclusively at the stage when 
contracts are selected by the contracting authority or whether already the bidding decisions of 
firms could be subject to border effects. Unfortunately, the TED data records only the firms 
winning a contract and all the non-winning bidders are not identified. We therefore address 
this issue by focusing on the special case of awards with only one bidder. Despite the caveats 
of using this subsample of our data, our estimates strongly suggest that border effects already 
affect the participation decisions of firms. 
The extent of the border effects we find is surprising since formal trade barriers have been 
abolished in the European Single Market by 1968. At least since the mid-1980s the EU also 
increasingly abolished non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards or technical 
regulations that are imposed by national governments for health and safety reasons. 
Moreover, there have been substantial efforts to also reduce informal barriers, for example, 
by standardizing various elements of public procurement procedures
5
 and by moving towards 
procurement digitalization. In any case, national differences cannot explain the very 
substantial cross-regional border effects that exist within countries. 
While there are several alternative explanations for border effects, we cannot exclude a 
potential home bias of contracting authorities in the award of public contracts. Since rational 
bidding firms would incorporate any potential home bias at the selection stage in their 
expectations, the border effects that we find in the participation decision of firms are not 
inconsistent with this explanation.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We relate our paper to the relevant 
existing literature in the next section. In Section 3 we discuss the data that we use in this 
article. In Section 4 we present our estimation strategy. We discuss our results in Section 5. 
In the final section we summarize, discuss policy implications, and argue that our findings are 
important from a welfare perspective. 
2 Related Literature 
This paper is related to a strand of literature that documents the negative impact of borders on 
the volume of trade using the gravity equation. McCallum (1995) initiated this literature by 
showing that the US-Canadian border had an unexpectedly strong effect: controlling for 
numerous variables, trade between the Canadian provinces was about 22 times higher than 
their trade with US states.
6
 An obvious explanation for border effects in trade is that formal 
or informal national barriers to trade such as tariffs, quotas, or regulatory differences must be 
responsible for this finding. More recently, however, it became clear that there must be 
additional reasons because sizable border effects were also found to exist in the supposedly 
highly integrated EU single market (Nitsch, 2000; Chen, 2004), on the subnational in the US 
(Wolf, 2000, Hillberry and Hummels, 2003, Coughlin and Novy, 2013, Crafts and Klein, 
2015), and even on the zip-code level (Hillberry and Hummels, 2008).
 
 
                                                 
5 
Examples are the standardization of procurement-specific nomenclature by creating the Common Procurement 
Vocabulary (CPV) and the introduction of standard forms for publication. 
6
 We refer the reader to Head and Mayer (2014) for more recent estimates of the border effect in trade. 
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This paper is also related to a descriptive literature that documents the extent of cross-
national public procurement. A study carried out for the European Commission reports that in 
the European Union only 1.6% of contracts awarded under the rules of the EU procurement 
Directives (or 3.5% of their value) were won by non-domestic bidders (European 
Commission, 2011).
7
 Using Eurostat input-output data, the same study concluded that import 
penetration differs significantly between the public and private sectors (7.5% to 19.1% 
respectively), stating that this difference is largely due to differences in the kinds of goods, 
services and works procured (i.e. that the public sector tends to relatively purchase more 
services, which are usually less tradable than goods). 
Similarly, Trionfetti (2000) and Brülhart and Trionfetti (2001) show that the import share of 
private sector purchases is substantially higher than the import share of government 
purchases and interpret this as home bias in public procurement. The most recent paper in this 
literature is Shingal (2015) who explores several explanations for the relatively low share of 
foreign procurement in Switzerland and Japan for the years 1990-2003. 
The present paper adds to this literature in several ways. Methodologically, this paper is the 
first that follows the trade literature and quantifies border effects by estimating bilateral 
procurement flows using a gravity equation. This approach has several advantages. Firstly, it 
allows us to quantify border effects while controlling for other explanatory variables, in 
particular geographical distance, origin and destination fixed effects as well as year and 
product category fixed effects. Secondly, unlike in the existing descriptive literature where 
border effects are often simply documented by a "relatively" low share of public vs. private 
import propensity, a formal test is straightforward in our estimation framework: border 
effects exist in case of a significant border coefficient in the estimated gravity equation.   
Thirdly, using micro-data allows us to gain more insights into the underlying causes of border 
effects, for example, by restricting the sample to awards that received only one bid and by 
distinguishing border effects by award value. Finally, unlike most trade data, our data set 
includes information on inter- as well was as intra-national transactions. This allows us to 
explore border effects not only across but also within countries. 
3 Data Description 
This study is based on European public procurement contract awards published on the 
European Union's Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) website. We use the address information 
of the contracting authority or entity (CAE) and the winning firm of each award to construct a 
data set that consists of bilateral procurement flows between NUTS3 (and NUTS2) region 
pairs. The data is then used to estimate gravity equations with border effects. 
3.1 Institutional Background and Tenders Electronic Daily 
                                                 
7
 This is referred to in the study as "direct" cross-border procurement. Alternatively, they define a broader 
category of "indirect" cross-border procurement that includes for example, awards won by local subsidiaries of 
foreign companies and by consortia of foreign and local firms. In our paper we consider only "direct" cross-
border procurement. 
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TED is an online supplement
8
 to the Official Journal of the EU containing the details of 
public procurement notices published under the coverage of the EU public procurement 
Directives.
9
 These Directives are relevant for and transposed by the EU member states and 
Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein (altogether the European Economic Area, EEA). 
TED contains information about different types of procurement notices
10
 that reflect the 
various administrative stages of the public procurement process followed by the CAEs
11
 
subject to the Directives. A "contract notice" announces the call for tenders for the provision 
of works, goods, or services. From it, firms are able to learn relevant information for their 
bids, like technical specifications, deadlines, award criteria, and other procedural aspects. 
Then, the CAE assesses the offers and decides who to award the procurement contract to. It is 
often the case that the procurement requested in a single contract notice is awarded to several 
firms. This may happen for instance when the contract notice is structured in different lots for 
which it is possible to bid separately. A single contract notice can therefore lead to one or 
more contract awards.
12
 In this paper we use information at the contract award level.  
The contract awards contain, amongst others, information regarding 
 the name and address of the contracting authority or entity, 
 the name and address of the winning firm,  
 the number of bids (however, not the identity of the non-winning bidders),  
 the value of the tender initially expected by the CAE,  
 the final value of the award,  
 the date of the award,  
 the specific award criterion used in the tender, 
 and the Common Procurement Vocabulary (CPV) code13 which serves to identify the 
type of good, service, or work to be procured.
14
  
                                                 
8
 The supplement is available online at http://ted.europa.eu/TED/.  
9
 Currently the Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, the Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and 
postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, the Directive 2014/23/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts, and Directive 
2009/81/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and 
service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defense and security. 
10
 A complete list of the different public procurement standard forms can be found in the TED website at 
http://simap.ted.europa.eu/standard-forms-for-public-procurement. 
11
 A contracting authority would be for example a ministry or a city council, whereas a contracting entity would 
be a publicly owned firm. 
12
 More precisely, the award decisions stemming from the contract notice are published through one or more 
"contract award notices." For example, one single contract notice can be followed by just one contract award 
notice which includes various contract awards. However, it can also be the case that there are several contract 
award notices, each including a single contract award. Any combination of these two situations is also possible, 
depending on the specificities of each procurement process. From a formal point of view, a contract award 
notice is a standard form, whereas a contract award (or award decision) is a specific section within the standard 
form for a contract award notice. 
13
 See https://simap.ted.europa.eu/cpv for details regarding the CPV classification.  
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The data has two important shortcomings. Firstly, information is sometimes missing, 
especially regarding the number of bids as well as the final value of an award. Secondly, it is 
important to note that while the data contains information on the total number of bidders, it 
only identifies the winning bidder, but not the other bidding firms. By definition, "all" 
bidders are therefore only identified if there is only a single offer, a special case that we 
exploit in Section 5.2.1. 
All contract notices whose value exceeds a certain amount are subject to the public 
procurement Directives and must be published in TED because they are presumed to be of 
"cross-border interest." These thresholds are set in the Directives and updated every two 
years.
15
 The thresholds apply to the (expected) total value of the contract notice and not 
separately to each of the contract award notices and contract awards that stem from it. It is 
not unusual that a contract notice of large value translates into many contract awards of 
smaller values that in some cases are below the corresponding threshold. In practice, this 
implies that many of the contract awards in our sample have values below the thresholds of 
the Directives. Moreover, another reason to observe below-threshold contract awards in our 
dataset is that publication in TED is often perceived as a sign of openness and many CAEs 
decide to publish in TED on a voluntary basis. Therefore, although the TED data base does 
not include all European public procurement activity, it does include the most of it in terms of 
value.  
3.2 Construction of the Data Sets 
We use a subset of the TED data that consists of 1,792,217 contract awards published 
between 2010 and 2014. Based on the address information in the data, we assign the NUTS3 
region
16
 of the CAE and the winning firm to each contract award.
17
 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 
The finest classification that we use in this paper consists of 45 so-called CPV divisions (Section 6.1).  Due to 
computational reasons we mostly aggregate these 45 CPV divisions to seven broader categories. Finally, 
sometimes we merely differentiate between goods, services, and construction works. We refer the reader to 
Table A4 for an overview. 
15
 The complete list of current thresholds is available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/rules-implementation/thresholds_en. As an illustration, in the context of the general procurement 
covered by Directive 2014/24/EU (i.e., procurement not related to the defense sector, specific utilities sectors or 
concessions) the procurement of supplies and services by central government authorities has a threshold of 
135,000 Euros, although subsidized services or certain services specifically listed have higher thresholds. Works 
contracts have a threshold of 5,225,000 Euros. 
16
 European NUTS regions are territorial nomenclatures based primarily on the current institutional divisions of 
the respective country, following national regional classifications of generic nature (as opposed to specific 
regional classifications such as mining regions or rail traffic regions, for example). The NUTS classification has 
three levels, with NUTS1 and NUTS2 roughly corresponding to, respectively, regions and provinces within a 
country (the NUTS0 level). The NUTS3 level corresponds to a less important administrative structure that 
should have an average population between 150.000 and 800.000 inhabitants. NUTS regions can change over 
time following the needs of the respective countries. In this paper we follow the NUTS 2013 classification. The 
respective shape file can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gisco/geodata/reference-
data/administrative-units-statistical-units. 
17
 There are 239,728 distinct town/postal code combinations in our data. For each of these distinct town/postal 
code combinations, we obtain the latitude and longitude using the Google Maps API. By combining this data 
with the Eurostat shape file on NUTS3 regions in Europe, we then assign a NUTS3 region to each CAE and to 
each winning firm in our dataset. 
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3.2.1 Pooled Data Set on NUTS3 Level 
We first construct a data set that consists of bilateral procurement flows tendered by CAEs 
located in NUTS3 region 𝑖 and awarded to firms located in NUTS3 region 𝑗. Hereafter, we 
refer to these as the "origin NUTS3" and the "destination NUTS3," respectively. We limit our 
sample to origin and destination regions within the EU plus Norway. Since there are such 
1,361 NUTS3 regions, the data set has 1,361 × 1,361 =  1,852,321 observations where each 
observation represents a NUTS3 region pair. We add NUTS3 level information on population 
figures from Eurostat.
18
  
In our empirical analysis we use two variables capturing the extent of procurement flows 
between pairs of regions. Firstly, we use the variable 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗 that we define as the total value 
of projects tendered by CAEs in NUTS3 region 𝑖 and won by firms located in region 𝑗.19 
Given that the information on final values of awarded contracts is sometimes missing, we 
also use the variable 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗   that is defined as the number of total contracts (i.e. not 
weighted by their value) published by CAEs located in NUTS3 region 𝑖 and awarded to firms 
in region 𝑗 . Additionally, we split these variables according to a broadly defined 
categorization of the subject of the procurement contract, i.e., we construct the variables 
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑗   distinguishing between goods, services or construction works. More 
information regarding the main variables used in this study is presented in Appendix Table 
A1. 
3.2.2 Data Set Including Time and Product Dimension on NUTS2 Level 
To explore border effects in more detail, we create a second data set that also takes into 
account differences in the subject of the procurement contract, that is, what exact good or 
service is procured, as well as in the year of publication of a notice in TED. 
Firstly, based on the CPV code provided in the data, we assign each award to one of seven 
broadly defined categories (see Appendix Table A4). While, for convenience, we refer to 
these as product categories it is important to note that in our context "product" refers not only 
to goods but also to services and construction works. Secondly, we distinguish between 
tenders published in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. 
Due to computational reasons, this data set is based on bilateral procurement flows between 
283 NUTS2 regions instead of the finer 1,361 NUTS3 regions and therefore consists of 
283 × 283 × 7 × 5 =  2,803,115  observations. 20  Descriptive statistics are reported in 
Appendix Table A2. 
3.3 Cross-Border Procurement: Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
18
 Note that we ignore public contracts won by countries outside of the EEA since the share is negligible. 
19
 The award value reported in the data is sometimes subject to mistakes, for example, due to typos. In order to 
prevent outliers to affect our results, we drop observations with values below the 5 percentile and above the 99 
percentile when using 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑗 as the dependent variable. 
20
 Using NUTS3 region pairs would result in a data set with 1,361 × 1,361 × 7 × 5 =  64,831,235 
observations. 
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Before turning to the estimation of the gravity equations, we report some descriptive 
statistics. Table 1 provides an overview of cross-region and cross-border procurement. 
Column (2) of Panel A documents that of all projects that were tendered in one of the 1,361  
NUTS3 regions in our data set, 31.31% were won by a firm in the same NUTS3 region. 
16.77% were won by firms located in other NUTS3 regions within the same NUTS2. 50.59% 
(10.86%+39.73%) came from the rest of the country and, finally, 1.32% were awarded to 
firms located outside of the country, that is, in a different NUTS0.
 
Columns (4), (6), and (8) 
show that at both the NUTS0 and NUTS3 levels the share of cross-border procurement is 
highest for goods and smaller for services and construction works. Panel B differentiates 
awards according to their value. It is apparent that international procurement takes place more 
often for high-value awards. Only about 0.49% of awards in the 1
st
 quartile are awarded to a 
different country but about 2.27% of awards in the 4
th
 quartile. A similar tendency is visible 
when projects are weighted by their total final value in panel C.  
Figure 1 visualizes the share of awards by CAEs located in a NUTS3 region that are awarded 
to firms located in other countries (a different NUTS0). While in general the share of cross-
border procurement in the whole EU is low, the map shows that it is not driven by any 
specific region or Member State. Scandinavian and Baltic countries have a relatively higher 
cross-border share. The map also suggests that in (geographically) larger countries, like 
France or Spain, NUTS3 regions closer to the border show higher rates compared to regions 
in the interior. This effect is particularly apparent is smaller countries like the Benelux and 
the central-eastern EU area.  
It is important to note that, despite being highly suggestive, the evidence reported in in Figure 
1 and Table 1 cannot be unambiguously interpreted as evidence of border effects in public 
procurement. The fact that only few cross-region and cross-border awards take place might 
be simply because trade costs increase with distance. For instance, the raw data for the 
procurement of construction works and services display stronger border effects than the data 
for goods procurement, since the former are more costly to trade over large distance than the 
latter. 
Figure 2, however, presents more descriptive evidence that the border effects we document 
are indeed not just driven by trade costs. The map in the upper left visualizes the geographic 
distribution of contracts awarded published by authorities located in the NUTS2 region 
around Frankfurt am Main (DEA2) (marked in green). It is clearly visible that the probability 
that firms in a given region win an award is decreasing in the distance to the DEA2 NUTS2. 
Almost no trade across national borders is visible. However, this might be just due to the 
distance effect. The upper right panel shows a similar map for contracts published by 
authorities located the NUTS2 region Cologne (DEA2) which is adjacent to Germany's 
national border with Belgium and the Netherlands and close to the border with Luxembourg. 
This map now provides very clear evidence that the national border matters greatly for 
procurement: it is apparent that firms based in German NUTS3 regions of equal distance to 
Cologne have a much higher probability of being awarded a contract than equivalent firms in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, or Luxembourg. 
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Figure 2 shows another example. The two Mediterranean islands Corsica and Sardinia are 
located next to each other; however, the first is part of France while the second is part of 
Italy. The contract awards clearly reflect this: in spite of similar distance to Italy and France, 
99.8% and 99.5% of contracts published by authorities located in Corsica and Sardinia are 
awarded to France and Italy, respectively. 
In the next section, we present a formal way of quantifying border effects in European public 
procurement based on the gravity model following the methodology proposed in the seminal 
paper by McCallum (1995). 
4 Estimation Strategy 
Our estimation strategy is based on the popular gravity model that is widely used in the 
analysis of international trade and more recently in other fields, such as migration and even 
innovation policy.
21
  
We propose a constant-elasticity model of the form 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 = exp(𝑿𝑖,𝑗𝜷) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 
with 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑗|𝑿𝑖,𝑗] = 0, and 
 𝑿𝑖,𝑗𝜷 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽1 ln 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽3 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛽4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆0𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽5𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆1𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆2𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛽7𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆3𝑖,𝑗 
(1) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗  is the number of tenders awarded to firms in 
NUTS3 region 𝑗 tendered by CAEs located in NUTS3 region 𝑖. Since by construction the 
probability to win a tender from a NUTS3 region that launches more tenders is higher, we use 
the total projects tendered by CAEs located in region 𝑖  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖  as an offset 
variable.
22
  
We expect tenders awarded by a NUTS3 region to rise proportionally to the economic 
activity of the origin NUTS3 region and tenders awarded to a NUTS3 region rise 
proportionally to the size of the destination NUTS3 region. We therefore include log-
population of region 𝑖 and 𝑗 (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖 and 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗) as control variables. 
We also expect that the distance between two NUTS3 regions (𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗) and the bilateral 
procurement flow between these two regions have a negative relationship. Distance captures 
transportation cost due to physical distance but might also be a proxy for transaction and 
                                                 
21
 See Section 2.4 in Head and Mayer (2014). 
22
 One obtains the same results by using the ratio 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
 as the dependent variable and weighting the 
regression by 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖. 
10 
 
information cost more generally (Portes and Rey, 2005)). As proposed by Leamer (1997) and 
Nitsch (2000), we calculate intra-NUTS3 distances based on land area.
23
  
Our main estimates of interest are the coefficients on the dummy variables 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
that capture the border effects we want to estimate. We measure border effects at the NUTS0, 
i.e., the country-level, the NUTS1, NUTS2, and the NUTS3 level. The dummies take the 
value 1 when 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the same NUTSX. 
A potential problem of specification (1) is that coefficient estimates might be biased due to 
omitted variable bias. We address this problem in specification (2) by including fixed effects 
for both the destination and the origin NUTS3 regions:
24
 
 𝑿𝑖,𝑗𝜞 = 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + 𝛾1 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾2𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆0𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝛾3𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆1𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆2𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛾5𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆3𝑖,𝑗 
(2) 
 
The fixed effects 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖  and 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗  capture unobserved characteristics of the origin NUTS3 
and the destination NUTS3.
25
 
To further explore the role of omitted variables for border effects, we also include dummy 
variables indicating whether two regions have the same language or use the same currency 
(the Euro) as well as control variables capturing differences in cultural values across EU 
member states. 
Finally, based on the data set described in Section 3.2.2, we estimate an extended 
specification (3) that also takes into that the probability of an award might vary over time and 
by the type of product or service that is procured: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 = exp(𝑿𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡𝜣) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 
with 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡|𝑿𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡] = 0, and 
𝑿𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡𝜣 = 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖 + 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑗 + _𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑘 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜃1 ln 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝜃2𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆0𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜃3𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆1𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜃4𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆2𝑖,𝑗 
(3) 
 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠_𝑤𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 refers to the number of tenders of product category 𝑘 published in year 𝑡 
awarded to firms in region 𝑗 tendered by CAEs located in region 𝑖. This specification allows 
us to estimate fixed effects 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑘  and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡  and therefore further alleviates 
                                                 
23
 We follow Head and Mayer (2000) and calculate the intra-NUTS3 distance as 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑖 = [
2
3
(
𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑖
𝜋
)
0.5
]. 
24
 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) show that the "traditional" gravity equation leads to biased estimates due 
to neglected exporter- and importer-specific multilateral resistance variables. One way of theory-consistent 
estimation of the gravity equation is to use importer and exporter fixed effects. See, for example, Harrigan 
(1996), Hilberry and Hummels (2003), Coughlin and Novy (2013), and Section 3.3 in Head and Mayer (2014). 
25
 Gravity factors (𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖  and 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑗) are not part of this specification because they are captured by the origin and 
destination region fixed effects. 
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concerns regarding biased estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity.
26
 As discussed in 
Section 3.2.2, for computational reasons specification (3) is estimated on a data set based on 
NUTS2 instead of the finer NUTS3 region pairs. 
As described in Table 1, there is a strong concentration of awards to nearby regions in our 
data. This implies that in all three specifications the dependent variable is characterized by a 
large count of zeros and a long right tail. To address this issue and to avoid inconsistent 
estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity, we follow Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and 
estimate specifications (1), (2), and (3) by using Poisson (pseudo)-maximum likelihood 
(PPML) with Eicker-White robust standard errors.
27
 
5 Results 
We begin by documenting border effects using the baseline specification and by exploring 
the role of common currency, language, and cultural values. We then estimate the model 
separately for goods, services, and construction procurement. In Section 5.2 we proceed by 
showing results based on the extended specification (3) that also takes into account 
heterogeneity over time and by the type of the good or service that is procured. In Section 
5.2.1 we analyze the special case of awards with only one bidder to better understand to what 
extent border effects are driven by limited participation of non-local firms. We then 
document that border effects exist even for very high value awards and we present some 
evidence that border effects seem to be decreasing towards the end of our sample period. In 
Section 5.2.4 we document substantial differences in border effects across finely 
disaggregated goods and service categories. Finally, we analyze the effect of the award 
criteria and the type of procedure that is used in the procurement process. 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report PPML estimates of, respectively, regression equations 
(1) and (2) when the number of projects 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the dependent variable. Column (1) 
shows results based on the traditional gravity equation. Column (2) reports estimates when 
fixed effects for the NUTS3 region of origin and destination are included.  
In both specifications we find that distance has a strong negative impact on the likelihood of 
winning a tender. According to our baseline specification in column (2), when the distance 
between the contracting authority's NUTS3 region and a given firm's NUTS3 regions 
doubles, the probability of that firm winning a tender decreases by about 32% (1-exp(-
0.385)).  
                                                 
26
 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we include interactions to allow origin and destination 
region fixed effects to vary by year. 
27
 Our data is clearly "over-dispersed," that is, the variance exceeds the mean. As advised by Head and Mayer 
(2014), we do not follow the recommendation by De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011) to use a negative binomial 
estimator in this case. Firstly, the PPML estimator remains consistent under over-dispersion. Secondly, as 
pointed out by Boulhol and Bosquet (2014), negative binomial PML estimates depend on the units of 
measurement of the dependent variable. 
12 
 
We find evidence of substantial border effects at both the international and intra-national 
level in both specifications. According to the baseline specification in column (2), firms 
located in the same NUTS3 as the contracting authority (hereafter "local firms") are two 
times (exp(0.718)) more likely to win a tender than firms located in a different NUTS3 within 
the same NUTS2 of the contracting authority. Firms located in a different NUTS2, but still 
within the same NUTS1 than the CAE are 4.6 times (exp(0.718+0.811)) less likely to win 
than a local firm. Firms located in a different NUTS1 than the CAE are 7.2 times 
(exp(0.718+0.811+0.447)) less likely to win compared to local firms. The most substantial 
border effect is the international one: a local firm is 2268 times 
(exp(0.718+0.811+0.447+5.751)) more likely to win than a foreign firm.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 document that results are qualitatively similar when projects 
are weighted by their value, that is,  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗 is the dependent variable. Comparing columns 
(2) and (4) we find that distance becomes more important while border effects become 
overall slightly less important.  
One needs to be careful to not interpret these sizable border effects as trade barriers. As we 
discuss in more detail below, theory shows that the border effect is identical to the product of 
the elasticity of substitution between "local" and "non-local" goods, services, and works, and 
the tariff-equivalent of any border barrier (e.g., Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). If goods, 
services, and works provided by "local" and "non-local" firms are very similar and therefore 
highly substitutable, a minor trade barrier or home bias can result in a very substantial border 
effect. 
5.1.1 Currency, Language, and Cultural Values 
Research in international trade suggests that differences in currency, language, and cultural 
values more generally might explain some of the border effects in public procurement.
28 
 The 
effect of currency and language can be easily estimated by adding dummy variables to 
regression equation (2) that indicate whether the same currency (the Euro) or the same 
language is used in the origin and destination NUTS3 region.  
Operationalizing the concept of cultural values is more challenging. We follow Ahern et al. 
(2015)
 
and use respondents' answers in the 2008 and 2009
29
 waves of the European Values 
Study to three questions capturing the attitude regarding the following aspects:
 30
 
                                                 
28
 Rose and van Wincoop (2001), for example, find that having a common currency is an important determinant 
of trade flows.  Similarly, there is ample evidence that sharing the same language and, more generally, having 
similar cultural values, is an important determinant of economic exchange. In a standard gravity model, 
Felbermayr and Toubal (2010) and Tadesse and White (2010) find that measures of cultural proximity positively 
affect trade volumes for Europe and the US, even after controlling for fixed effects and other covariates. Guiso 
et al. (2009) document that bilateral trust, as a reflection of cultural biases, has an important impact on trade, 
portfolio investments, and FDI between European countries. Other research finds that cultural differences affect 
interest rates in international syndicated bank loans (Gianetti and Yafeh, 2012), venture-capital flows (Bottazzi 
et al., 2016), cross-regional migration flows (Falck et al., 2012), and the volume of cross-border mergers (Ahern 
et al., 2015).  
29
 We use the latest waves available. Belgium, Finland, Italy, Sweden, and Great Britain were surveyed in 2009, 
the rest of countries in our sample and Northern Ireland were surveyed in 2008. 
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1. Trust versus distrust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?" 
 
2. Hierarchy versus egalitarianism: "People have different ideas about following 
instruction at work. Some say that one should follow instructions of one’s superiors 
even when one does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow 
one’s superior’s instructions only when is convinced that they are right. Which of 
these two opinions do you agree with?" 
 
3. Individualism versus collectivism: "Income equality. How would you place your 
views on this scale?" (From 1 “Incomes should be made more equal” to 10 “We need 
larger income differences as incentives”). 
 
We then operationalize cultural differences between country 𝑖  and 𝑗  by including  ln(1 +
|Δ𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗|) ,  ln(1 + |Δℎ𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑦𝑖,𝑗|) , and ln(1 + |Δ𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑗|)
31
 as control 
variables in regression equation (2).
 32
  
Column (1) of Table 3 shows that having the same language and the same currency indeed 
increases the likelihood of winning a tender by about 159% (exp(0.954)-1) and 94% 
(exp(0.667)-1), respectively.
33
 Column (2) reports results when controls for cultural 
differences are also included. The bilateral distance between two countries in terms of trust is 
highly significant and has a negative impact on the number of cross-border procurement 
projects. Cultural distance as measured by hierarchy and individualism, on the other hand, is 
not significantly different from zero. 
The results show that currency, language, and culture can explain part of the international 
border effect.
34
 When comparing column (2) of Table 2 with column (1) and (2) of Table 3, it 
is apparent that the estimated coefficient on the same_NUTS0 dummy becomes substantially 
smaller: when controlling for currency and language, residing in the same country as the 
CAE (but in a different NUTS1) increases the likelihood of winning 176 fold (exp(5.171)) 
instead of 314 fold (exp(5.751)). Controlling for cultural distance decreases this further to 
127 fold (exp(4.846)).  Overall, estimates in column (2) of Table 3 imply that, compared to a 
                                                                                                                                                        
30
 The most well-known approaches to construct measures of cultural values are the European Values Study and 
the World Values Survey, the five-dimension classification system of Hofstede (1980, 2001), the three- 
dimension system of Schwartz (1994), the seven-dimension system of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 
(2011), and the four-dimension system of Fiske (1991). In this paper we follow Ahern et al. (2015) because the 
importance of trust for economic exchange is well documented, and since measures of "hierarchy" and 
"individualism" are shared by all of the above classification systems. 
31
 Note that unlike for example the trust matrix used in Guiso et al. (2009), these measures are symmetric, i.e., 
the distance from country 𝑖 to country 𝑗 is the same as the distance from 𝑗 to 𝑖. 
32
 Note that the dummy variables capturing same currency and language as well as the variables capturing 
cultural values only vary at the NUTS0 level. 
33
 This finding is in line with Rose and van Wincoop (2001) who quantify the effect of different currencies on 
barriers to international trade. 
34
 Since our measures of common currency, language, and cultural differences only vary across but not within 
countries, coefficients on the same_NUTS1, same_NUTS2, and same_NUTS3 are virtually not affected by the 
inclusion of the these variables.  
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firm located in a different country, a local firm residing in the same NUTS3 as the CAE is 
about 930 times exp(0.724+0.816+0.452+4.846) more likely to win an award. 
The relative importance of sharing the same currency and having similar cultural values 
becomes much smaller, however, when projects are weighted by their value in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 3. Currency and cultural differences therefore seem to work as an implicit 
barrier to the cross-national award of public contracts, however, more so for relatively low-
value public procurement. 
5.1.2 Goods, Services, and Construction Works Procurement 
Apart from goods procurement, services and construction works procurement comprises a 
large share of projects in our data: Between 2010 and 2014 around 45% of awards referred to 
service or works contracts, equaling about 68% of the value of all awards (Table 1). While 
the baseline results reported in Tables 2 and 3 are based on all contract awards in our data set, 
there are several reasons to expect that the determinants of goods procurement and of services 
and works procurement might differ, in particular regarding border and distance effects.
35
  
Firstly, the provision of works and most services, with the exception of, e.g., electronically 
delivered business services, requires physical contact between producers and consumers. 
Works and services are also more likely to be "tailored" to the customer and therefore 
potentially require monitoring and quality control (e.g., Freund and Weinhold, 2002). Their 
provision to distant locations is therefore often infeasible or very costly. Secondly, due to the 
higher requirement for personal interaction and communication, language and cultural issues 
might be relatively more important for the provision of services and construction than for the 
provision of goods. Finally, national regulations regarding the provision of services and 
works are widespread and potentially act as implicit barriers to trade.
36
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (2) using the subsamples of procurement 
of goods, services and construction works, both in terms of number of projects and of total 
final value of the projects. All regressions also include controls for common currency, 
language, and cultural values. We find that distance is a much stronger deterrent of 
procurement flows for services, especially for construction works, than for goods. More 
precisely, when the distance between the CAE and the firm doubles, the likelihood of 
winning a tender for goods decreases by 26% (1-exp(-0.309)), whereas it reduces by almost 
40% (1-exp(-0.512)) in the case of services procurement and by more than 65% (1-exp(-
1.071)) in the case of construction. These results, based on the number of projects, are also 
confirmed in the sample weighted by the total final value of the projects (columns (4) to (6)). 
                                                 
35
 This is confirmed in the empirical trade literature. Using a gravity model, Kimura and Lee (2006) and Head et 
al. (2009) find that services trade is subject to stronger distance effects than goods trade.
 
Similarly, using a 
structural gravity model, Anderson et al. (2015) find important differences in the determinants of goods and 
services trade. They document large border effects in services trade that vary widely by sector in an intuitive 
way. Importantly, they also show that border effects in services trade have been falling in the last years. This is 
line with the view that the emergence of the internet greatly facilitated the trade of certain services (Freund and 
Weinhold, 2002, 2004). See also Tharakan et al. (2005) who, using gravity framework, finds no distance effect 
of Indian software (services) exports. 
36
 See, for example, Nordås and Rouzet (2015) and Nordås (2016). 
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Combined border dummy variables play a more important role in the procurement of services 
than in goods or construction works. For instance, in services a local firm is 1610 times 
(exp(0.981+1.038+0.727+4.638)) more likely to win than a foreign firm, while just 380 times 
more (exp(0.798+0.726+0.725+3.692)) in the case of construction works and 441 times more 
(exp(0.221+0.480+0.193+5.197)) in the case of goods. However, intra-national border effects 
are clearly higher in the case of services and construction works. For example, compared to a 
national firm located in a different NUTS1 than the CAE, a local firm is 15 times 
(exp(0.981+1.038+0.727)) more likely to win a service contract and 9.5 times 
(exp(0.798+0.726+0.725)) more likely to win a construction works contract. For the 
procurement of goods the local firm is only 2.4 (exp(0.221+0.480+0.193)) times more likely 
to win.
37
  
We also find support for the hypothesis that services and construction works require 
relatively more personal interaction and communication and that having the same language is 
therefore more important. For construction works and services, having the same language 
increases the likelihood of an award by about 600% and 200%, respectively, while this figure 
is only 60% for goods.
38
 Sharing the same currency, on the other hand, is most important for 
goods procurement and least important for construction works. 
In summary, while we find important differences between border effect of public 
procurement of goods, services, and construction works, border effects are sizable for all 
three types of procurement. 
5.2 Results of the Extended Specification 
We showed in Section 5.1.2 that the determinants of the award of a public tender vary 
substantially by the subject of the procurement contract. A potential concern is therefore that 
some of the border effects we documented above might be due to composition effects. In this 
section we address this issue by presenting estimates of the extended gravity equation (3) that 
allows for the inclusion of both time and product category fixed effects.
39
  
The results are reported in Table 5. We find substantial border effects that are quantitatively 
similar to the baseline results in Tables 2 and 3. Language, currency, and cultural values 
again account for a part of the international border effects. The relatively stronger negative 
effect of distance on the likelihood of an award compared to the baseline results can be 
explained by the less fine spatial aggregation regression equation (3) is estimated on: since 
the specification does not allow for the inclusion of NUTS3 border effects, these are 
implicitly attributed to distance.  
                                                 
37
 This mixed effect of intra- and international border effects is consistent with Coughlin and Novy (2016). In 
their model, higher internal trade frictions imply lower (national) border effects. 
38
 Respectively, exp(1.907)-1, exp(1.126)-1, and exp(0.452)-1. 
39
 As mentioned above, we use the term "product" here for convenience. Technically, we are capturing the 
"subject of the procurement contract" which can include goods but also services and construction, see Appendix 
Table A4. 
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A remaining concern is that the transportation cost captured by geographical distance might 
substantially differ across for different goods or services and that this might result in biased 
estimates. In column (4), we take this into account by including interactions that allow the 
effect of distance to vary by the subject of the procurement contract. In line with Section 
5.1.2, we find that distance is generally least important for goods, e.g., for medical products 
(which consists mostly of pharmaceuticals) and most important for services and construction 
works. However, most importantly, while we find important differences in the effect of 
distances, the border effects estimated by this specification remain remarkably similar to the 
ones reported in column (3). As before, our findings are qualitatively similar when projects 
are weighted by the value of the award in columns (5) to (8). 
5.2.1 Awards with One and Multiple Offers 
Border effects might exist because CAEs might have a tendency to select offers of local firms 
over other bids, i.e., CAEs might be subject to a home bias.
 40
 An alternative hypothesis is 
that for many tenders only local bidders apply. Border effects might therefore not be due to 
selection but might be a consequence of firms' bidding behavior for public contracts. These 
two scenarios have substantially different policy implications.  
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to empirically disentangle these two cases since, as 
mentioned in Section 3.1, our data does not contain information on all bidders (but only on 
the winning bidder).  We can, however, make some progress by analyzing the special case of 
awards that received only a single offer since, by definition, for this subset of awards border 
effects cannot result from a potential tendency of the CAE to select local firms.  
As can be seen in Figure 3, about 22% of awards received only a single bid.
41
 Columns (1) to 
(4) of Table 6 compare estimates of regression equation (3) for the subset of awards that 
received one and multiple offers. Columns (1) and (2) report similar border dummies for both 
subsamples, except for the NUTS1 level, suggesting that already the participation decision of 
firms is subject to border effects. Adding controls for common language, currency, and 
cultural values in columns (3) and (4) leads to a relatively stronger decrease of the NUTS0 
border coefficient for sample with multiple offers (column (4)). These variables therefore 
seem to be relatively more important for the selection of offers than for the participation 
decision of firms. This is also consistent with the finding that having the same language is not 
significant different from zero for the sample of single bids (column (3)). The results are 
qualitatively similar when awards are weighted by value in columns (5) to (8). 
While these results point towards border effects already existing in the participation decision 
of firms to bid for public contracts, an important caveat is that we cannot exclude the 
possibility that a (perceived) home bias, that is, a tendency of CAEs to favor of local 
                                                 
40
 Home bias has been documented in many other contexts such as, for example, asset holdings (French and 
Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999; Ahearne et al., 2004), the wind turbine industry (Coşar et al., 2015), online 
products markets (Hortaçsu et al., 2009), online crowdfunding markets (Lin and Viswanathan, 2015). 
41
 For about 12% of awards information on the number of offers is missing in the data. The figures presented 
here refer to the subsample with non-missing information. 
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providers in the award of contracts, is incorporated into the bidding firms' expectations.
42
 The 
mere expectation of such a tendency in the selection process --whether justified or not-- 
might then result in border effects due to limited participation of non-local firms, in particular 
if bidding is subject to a cost. 
5.2.2 Award Value 
There is substantial variation in the value of awards. As reported in Table 7, the median 
award in our data set has a value of only 33,238 Euros while the 95 percentile is almost 2 
Million and the 99 percentile and 11 Million. For example, some big awards by the UK 
government, mostly in the transport sector, have values of up to 11 Billion Euros. 
The descriptive statistics in panel B of Table 1 shows that cross-border procurement is 
increasing in the value of a contract: the share of cross-border awards is 0.49% for the 1st 
quartile but 2.27% for the 4th quartile. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the extent of cross-
regional procurement is decreasing in value: for example, for the 1st quartile 23.4% of 
awards went to the same NUTS3 of the CAE while it was 37.28% for the 4th quartile. 
Table 8 reports results when regression equation (3) is estimated separately by quartile in 
columns (1) to (4) and for awards above the 95 percentile in column (5). The results confirm 
the pattern we found in the descriptive statistics. The NUTS0 border effect decreases with 
value:  a firm located in the same country (but in a different NUTS1 region) is 189 times 
(exp(5.243)) more likely to be awarded a low-value contract (1st quartile) than a firm located 
in a different country. For a high value contract (4th quartile), it is only 88 times (exp(4.483))  
more likely. The results remain qualitatively unchanged when border effects by quartile are 
jointly estimated (column (6)) and when the sample is constrained to awards with only one 
bidder (column (7)). Also consistent with the descriptive statistics, we find that intra-national 
border effects are increasing with the award value. 
One interpretation of the decreasing national border effects with value is that firms face a 
fixed cost to participate in cross-national procurement transactions (e.g., dealing with an 
unfamiliar legal context and differences in technical specifications, preparing documents in a 
different language). Since these costs are not one-to-one related to the award value, it 
becomes relatively more profitable for foreign firms to bid for high value projects. This 
interpretation is also consistent with, firstly, the finding that also in the one bidder case 
(column (7)) national border effects are decreasing with the value of the award, suggesting 
that border effects already exist in the participation decision of firms (Section 5.2.1), and 
secondly, that the importance of common language, currency and cultural values as 
explanatory variables decreases as the value of the award increases across columns (1) to (5). 
Finally, this interpretation would be consistent with models of international trade that 
                                                 
42
 For example, according to a recent study by the European Commission 77% of 1,011 surveyed companies 
with experience in dealing with public procurement in the EU stated that the perceived preference among CAEs 
for local bidders constitutes a relevant barrier to cross-border public procurement (European Commission, 
2017). 
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incorporate heterogeneous firms and fixed cost of exporting (e.g., Chaney, 2008 and 
Helpman et al., 2008). 
The finding that that intra-national border effects are slightly increasing in the award value is 
surprising. A potential explanation is that this finding is an artefact of composition effects 
that are not fully captured by our fixed effects: higher value projects are more likely to be 
tendered in NUTS regions with higher GDP and population. However, in these economically 
more important regions also the also the number of potential local providers is likely to be 
higher.
43
  
5.2.3 Border Effects over Time 
We assess the evolution of border effects over time by interacting the three 𝑠𝑎𝑚 �_𝑁𝑈𝑇𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑗 
dummies in equation (3) with variables that indicate whether a notice was published in 2011, 
2012, 2013, or 2014. The inclusion of these interactions allows us to estimate border effects 
relative to tenders published in the year 2010, the beginning of our sample. The results are 
reported in Appendix Table A3 and for convenience visualized in Figure 4. The upper and 
middle graphs show the evolution of the NUTS2 and the sum of the NUTS1 and NUTS2 
border effects, respectively (the intra-national border effects). The bottom graph shows the 
sum of all three border effects (i.e., including the international effect). To ease interpretation, 
we always show the exponentials of the coefficient estimates reported in Table A3. 
Although the coefficients on the interactions tend to be imprecisely estimated, there is 
nevertheless a tendency towards decreased border effects that is visible in all three graphs. 
While this tendency also exists on the intra-national level, it is more pronounced on the 
international level (the bottom graph), i.e., especially the NUTS0 border effect is becoming 
smaller in value. According to the bottom graph, for example, the total border effects in 2013 
and 2014 are statistically significantly lower than in 2010. The difference is quantitatively 
important: in 2014, the level of the total border effect is about 70% of its 2010 level. 
5.2.4 Border Effects by Type of Product  
In Section 5.1.2 we documented that border effects vary substantially by goods, services, and 
construction works procurement. In this section we explore this further by estimating gravity 
equations separately for 45 CPV divisions that provide a more disaggregated classification of 
goods and services, see Section 3.2.2 and Table A4.
44
 The results are shown in Table 9.  For 
convenience, only the border and distance effects are reported. The categories are ranked 
according to the total international border effect, that is, the sum of the coefficients on the 
three border dummies. 
While the estimates show very substantial differences in border effects across CPV divisions, 
it is important to note that the NUTS0 border effect remains significantly different from zero 
                                                 
43
 To capture this, one would have to include a full set of 283 × 283 interacted origin and destination NUTS2 
region fixed effects. 
44
 In order to prevent an excessive high number of zeros, we use a simplified cross-sectional version of equation 
(3) that does not include year fixed effects. Since there are 283 NUTS2 regions the number of observations used 
to estimate each of the 45 regressions is 283 × 283 = 80,089. 
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in all cases and so do the intra-national border effects in almost all cases. An important 
insight is therefore that even on a relatively fine level of disaggregation, virtually all types of 
goods and services are subject to both inter- and intra-national border effects. 
In line with the results reported in Table 4, we find that border effects are more important for 
services than for goods. For example, out of the CPV divisions ranked in the top 10 according 
to the total international border effect, 8 are services. To the contrary, among the bottom 10 
CPV divisions in the rank, 9 correspond to goods. The two good categories with relatively 
high border effects consist of highly substitutable products (e.g., fuel and water). This is 
consistent with what has been documented in the international trade literature (e.g., Chen, 
2004). 
5.2.5 Award Criteria and Type of Procedure 
The border effects we document above could result from the choice of certain administrative 
procedures. We analyze the effect of the award criterion used in a tender and whether a 
tender is published under an "open" or "restricted" procedure. 
Award Criteria 
The public procurement Directives
45
 provide that the CAE shall base the award of public 
contracts either on the lowest price only or on the so-called "most economically advantageous 
tender" (MEAT). Under the MEAT criterion, other factors than price (like quality, cost-
effectiveness, after-sales service, etc.) are taken into account for the award.
46
 In our sample 
46% and 43% of the contracts have been awarded following the lowest price and MEAT 
criterion, respectively (Appendix Table A1).
47
  
The price-only criterion is directly comparable and in principle less subject to product 
differentiation effects that can soften competition. Therefore, it could be the case that regions 
where MEAT is more prevalent show lower rates of cross-border procurement because 
foreign firms may find it more difficult to bid competitively taking into account factors other 
than price that can be linked to local preferences or specificities. 
Table 10 reports for estimates of regression equation (3) for tenders using MEAT and lowest 
price criterion. Tenders using the MEAT criterion seem to be subject to substantially higher 
intra-national border effects: the coefficients on same_NUTS1 and same_NUTS2 are both 
substantially higher for the MEAT subsample. Also, having a common language and 
currency are more important determinants in the case of MEAT than lowest price. On the 
other hand, the international border effect is higher for the subsample using the lowest price 
criterion. As discussed previously, this is in line with Coughlin and Novy (2016). 
Type of Procedure 
                                                 
45
 See Directive 2004/18/EC and Directive 2004/17/EC for the relevant legal provisions concerning EU public 
procurement in our sample period. 
46
 The new Directives 2014/24/EC and 2014/25/EC set, without prejudice to national legislations, MEAT as the 
preferential award mechanism. 
47
 For the remaining awards information on the award criterion used is missing. 
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The public procurement Directives
48
 establish the general obligation of CAEs to award public 
contracts by using so-called "open" or "restricted" procedures. In an open procedure any 
interested firm can submit a tender whereas in a restricted procedure any firm can request to 
participate in the tendering process but only those firms invited by the CAE will be able to 
submit a tender. 
Under specific circumstances other procedures can be used. These are for instance the 
"negotiated" procedure, which can take place with or without the publication of a previous 
contract notice, and the "competitive dialogue." In a negotiated procedure the CAE consults 
the firms of its choice and negotiates the terms of the contract with them. In a competitive 
dialogue the CAE usually has a specific procurement need, i.e., a need for which a suitable 
solution is not readily available in the market. Any firm can request to participate in the 
process, but the CAE can select those with which to discuss the manners to satisfy its need 
and following those discussions the CAE is allowed to narrow down further the list of firms 
allowed to submit a tender.
49
 
The open and restricted procedures may be regarded as the more competitive ones in nature. 
They are also the most commonly used: About 90% of projects in our data sets are tendered 
either according to the "open" or "restricted" procedure (see Appendix Table A1). 
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 10 reports estimates of equation (3) when only projects that use 
the "open" or "restricted" procedure are considered. The estimates are very similar to our 
results reported in columns (3) and (7) of Table 5. The border effects that we document above 
are therefore not a result of the tendering procedure. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we use data on 1.8 million public contract award decisions to empirically 
quantify border effects in public procurement in the European Single Market. We match the 
address information in the data to geo-locations to construct a data set of bilateral public 
procurement flows between NUTS3 region pairs. Following a methodology first proposed by 
McCallum (1995), we then estimate a gravity model with border effects. We document very 
sizable inter- as well as intra-national border effects despite controlling for numerous 
variables, such as origin- and destination fixed effects, physical distance, common language, 
currency, and cultural similarity.  
In our baseline results we find that a local firm is about twice as likely to win a contract as a 
non-local firm in the same NUTS2 region and about seven times more likely to be awarded 
compared to a firm in a different NUTS1 region. We document the most sizable border 
effects on the international level: a local firm is over 900 times more likely to be awarded a 
contract than a foreign firm. While border effects are weaker for goods procurement and 
                                                 
48
 Ibid. footnote 45. 
49
 There exists also a variant of the negotiated and restricted procedures called "accelerated," where deadlines 
are shortened if additional conditions are met. 
21 
 
larger for construction works and services procurement, they are substantial even for finely 
defined product categories. We also document that border effects are becoming smaller 
towards the more recent years. 
We find that cultural differences across European Member States can only explain a part of 
border effects. Moreover, we find that the award criterion used has an impact on the border 
effects: intra-national border effects are larger when the "most economically advantageous 
tender" instead of the "lowest price" criterion is used. The latter is of some policy importance, 
because since recently the former is now the preferential award mechanism.   
Interestingly, international border effects are decreasing with the value of an award. In line 
with international trade models that assume a fixed cost of exporting, this finding suggests 
that firms wanting to bid for public contracts awarded in another EU Member State may still 
face important obstacles that are worth dealing with only for high value projects. Consistent 
with this interpretation, estimates based on the subsample of awards with only one bidder 
suggest that already the decision of firms to bid for public contracts is subject to border 
effects.  
These findings are surprising since customs duties and quantitative restrictions were 
progressively abolished in the European Single Market by 1968. We can therefore exclude 
that formal trade barriers are the reason for the border effects we document in this paper. 
Moreover, above-threshold European public procurement legislation is explicitly aimed at 
promoting cross-border procurement. In particular, tendering procedures have been 
harmonized in order to prevent the administrative burden of cross-border transactions. Also, 
the requirement that all above-threshold contracts must be publicized at the EU-level has 
been in place for long time. This implies that information asymmetries, that is, the fact that 
firms are simply unaware of ongoing tenders in other countries are unlikely to be the reason 
for the border effects.  
At least since the mid-1980s, the EU also focused on abolishing non-tariff barriers, such as 
differences in standards or technical regulations that are imposed by national governments for 
health and safety reasons.
50
 Moreover, there have been efforts to reduce "hidden" trade costs, 
such as the (real or perceived) relative difficulty in enforcing contracts across jurisdictions.
51
 
In any case, while the remaining non-tariff barriers and "hidden" trade costs between 
countries might have some importance for international border effects, they cannot explain 
the substantial within-country border effects that we document in this paper. 
The underlying reasons for border effects in the award of public contracts, in particular on the 
intra-national level, remain therefore unclear. On the one hand, our results based on the 
                                                 
50
 See, for example, the 1985 White Paper COM(85) 310 final "Completing the Internal Market" (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1985). We refer the reader to Head and Mayer (2000) for an economic evaluation 
of the "Single European Act" that was implementing some of the issues that were raised. Recent evidence that 
technical barriers diminish the trade volume of goods can be found in Chen (2004) and Essaji (2008). 
51
 For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) show evidence that such "hidden" trade costs might reduce 
the volume of trade.  
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subsample of awards with only one bidder suggest that border effects already exist in the 
participation decision of firms bidding for public contracts. While limited participation is 
consistent with, for example, tacit collusion based on the home-market principle (e.g., Roux 
et al., 2016), the fact that we find border effects for all product categories, however, makes 
this explanation less probable. An alternative explanation is that public procurement is 
subject to some degree of home bias, that is, contracting authorities might have a preference 
for consuming locally provided goods and services. Such a home bias would also be 
consistent with the observed limited participation of firms and recent survey evidence on 
firms' expectations regarding the chances of succeeding in cross-border procurement. The 
very expectation of a home bias in the selection process would have an impact on the bidding 
behavior of firms in the first place, in particular if bidding is costly. Since the policy 
implications substantially differ between these scenarios, more research into the causes of 
border effects in the award of public contracts is necessary. 
From a policy perspective, the welfare losses due to border effects and the need for policy 
action differs by the specific goods or services that are the subject of the public contract. 
Policies should focus on goods and services for which the substitutability of locally and non-
locally varieties is lowest since theory shows that in these cases welfare losses are highest.
52
 
Since we document border effects for a wide range of finely defined good and service 
categories the overall welfare loss due to border effects in European public procurement is 
likely to be substantial. 
  
                                                 
52
 Theory shows that the border effect is identical to the product of the elasticity of substitution between "local" 
and "non-local" goods, services, and works, and the tariff-equivalent of any border barrier (e.g., Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2003). If goods, services, and works provided by "local" and "non-local" firms are very similar 
and therefore highly substitutable, a minor trade barrier or home bias can result in a very substantial border 
effect. In this case, the consequences for welfare, however, would be minor and scope for policy action would 
be smaller. If, on the other hand, the substitutability is low and border effects are primarily driven by trade 
barriers, adverse welfare effects might be substantial (Evans, 2003). 
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Figure 1: Share of cross-border by NUTS3 region 
 
  
Notes: The figure shows the share of cross-border (NUTS0) procurement share by origin NUTS3 region. 
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Figure 2: Example of the geographic distribution of awards 
  
  
Notes: Clockwise from the top left, the figure shows the geographic distribution of contract awards by 
contracting authorities or entities (CAE) located in NUTS2 regions Darmstadt/Frankfurt am Main (DE71), 
Cologne (DEA2), Sardinia (ITG2) and Corsica (FR83). 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Number of Offers 
 
  
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the number of offers received. 
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Figure 4: Border Effects over Time 
 
  
Notes: The figure visualizes the evolution of border effects relative to 2010. Exponentials of the coefficients 
reported in Appendix Table A3 are shown. The dependent variable is the number of projects (blue) or total final 
value (red). The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share
Same NUTS3 561141 31.31% 213969 21.72% 260322 42.49% 86066 44.75%
Same NUTS2 300609 16.77% 135359 13.74% 124581 20.34% 40371 20.99%
Same NUTS1 194707 10.86% 108418 11.00% 64565 10.54% 21481 11.17%
Same Country 712017 39.73% 511303 51.89% 157236 25.67% 42890 22.30%
Different Country 23743 1.32% 16259 1.65% 5938 0.97% 1536 0.80%
Total 1792217 100.00% 985308 100.00% 612642 100.00% 192344 100.00%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number Share Number Share Number Share Number Share
Same NUTS3 74750 23.40% 90587 28.36% 115873 36.28% 119077 37.28%
Same NUTS2 54989 17.22% 50365 15.77% 53307 16.69% 55875 17.49%
Same NUTS1 28150 8.81% 29812 9.33% 32733 10.25% 37723 11.81%
Same Country 159943 50.08% 146148 45.76% 113582 35.56% 99458 31.14%
Different Country 1561 0.49% 2481 0.78% 3898 1.22% 7260 2.27%
Total 319393 100.00% 319393 100.00% 319393 100.00% 319393 100.00%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
Same NUTS3 150214.2 36.71% 36547.8 28.02% 63246.2 42.07% 49689.5 39.07%
Same NUTS2 71764.8 17.54% 17011.6 13.04% 28431.4 18.91% 26248.8 20.64%
Same NUTS1 49424.3 12.08% 16629.4 12.75% 16146.2 10.74% 16576.3 13.03%
Same Country 128303.0 31.35% 54877.5 42.07% 40253.6 26.78% 32795.3 25.79%
Different Country 9511.8 2.32% 5388.7 4.13% 2249.0 1.50% 1867.6 1.47%
Total 409218.1 100.00% 130454.9 100.00% 150326.3 100.00% 127177.5 100.00%
Panel B: Projects by Quartiles of Total Final Value
Table 1: Cross-Border Procurement
Panel A: Number of Projects
Panel C: Total Final Value in Euros (in Millions)
Notes: Panel A documents the number of projects that were won by firms located in the the same NUTS3, NUTS2, NUTS1,
or country as the contracting authority. Panel B differentiates projects depending on the the total final value of the award. In
panel C projects are weighted by their total final value.
Services Construction WorksGoodsAll
All Goods Construction WorksServices
4th Quartile1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Projects (Share) Number of Projects Total Final Value 
(Share)
Total Final Value (in 
Euros)
same_NUTS0 5.618*** 5.751*** 4.867*** 5.126***
(0.0702) (0.0708) (0.0850) (0.0611)
same_NUTS1 0.714*** 0.447*** 0.938*** 0.499***
(0.0611) (0.0386) (0.0694) (0.0411)
same_NUTS2 0.739*** 0.811*** 0.765*** 0.741***
(0.0735) (0.0504) (0.0784) (0.0426)
same_NUTS3 1.243*** 0.718*** 1.206*** 0.445***
(0.0743) (0.0716) (0.0849) (0.0586)
Distance (log) -0.288*** -0.385*** -0.281*** -0.549***
(0.0449) (0.0340) (0.0575) (0.0274)
Origin Pop. (log) -0.403*** -0.395***
(0.0229) (0.0244)
Destination Pop. (log) 1.189*** 1.114***
(0.0309) (0.0306)
Observations 1,841,440 1,842,794 1,837,360 1,837,360
R-squared 0.373 0.795 0.306 0.906
Origin NUTS3 FE NO YES NO YES
Destination NUTS3 FE NO YES NO YES
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is the number of projects
in columns (1) and (2) and the total final value in million Euros in columns (3) to (4). Columns (1) and (3) include the
total projects tendered by authority i as an offset variable. Columns (2) and (4) contain origin and destination NUTS3
region fixed effects. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-White robust
standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
same_NUTS0 5.171*** 4.846*** 4.637*** 4.560***
(0.0869) (0.135) (0.0862) (0.137)
same_NUTS1 0.452*** 0.452*** 0.507*** 0.507***
(0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0412) (0.0412)
same_NUTS2 0.813*** 0.816*** 0.745*** 0.747***
(0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0426) (0.0427)
same_NUTS3 0.722*** 0.724*** 0.453*** 0.454***
(0.0715) (0.0715) (0.0586) (0.0585)
Distance (log) -0.382*** -0.380*** -0.544*** -0.542***
(0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0275) (0.0275)
Origin Pop. (log)
Destination Pop. (log)
Same Language 0.954*** 0.930*** 1.019*** 1.013***
(0.126) (0.102) (0.140) (0.126)
Same Currency 0.667*** 0.734*** 0.115 0.0707
(0.154) (0.169) (0.157) (0.172)
Trust -2.169*** -1.571***
(0.364) (0.462)
Hierarchy 0.0386 -0.657
(0.875) (0.812)
Individualism -0.807 1.225
(1.016) (1.014)
Observations 1,842,794 1,842,794 1,837,360 1,837,360
R-squared 0.795 0.795 0.906 0.906
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES
Number of Projects Total Final Value (in Euros)
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equations (2). The dependent variable is the number of
projects in columns (1) and (2) and the total final value in million Euros in columns (3) and (4). All
specifications include origin and destination NUTS3 region fixed effects. The method of estimation is
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table 3: Currency, Language, and Cultural Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Goods Services Construction Goods Services Construction
same_NUTS0 5.197*** 4.638*** 3.692*** 5.014*** 5.025*** 4.072***
(0.183) (0.163) (0.117) (0.237) (0.182) (0.186)
same_NUTS1 0.193*** 0.727*** 0.725*** 0.203*** 0.508*** 0.674***
(0.0355) (0.0402) (0.0334) (0.0426) (0.0536) (0.0468)
same_NUTS2 0.480*** 1.038*** 0.726*** 0.374*** 1.019*** 0.687***
(0.0513) (0.0472) (0.0381) (0.0543) (0.0529) (0.0453)
same_NUTS3 0.221*** 0.981*** 0.798*** -0.0809 0.643*** 0.524***
(0.0842) (0.0601) (0.0502) (0.0705) (0.0674) (0.0603)
Distance (log) -0.309*** -0.512*** -1.071*** -0.417*** -0.501*** -0.890***
(0.0339) (0.0290) (0.0207) (0.0278) (0.0330) (0.0315)
Same Language 0.452*** 1.126*** 1.907*** 0.318** 0.647*** 2.268***
(0.109) (0.133) (0.169) (0.134) (0.216) (0.292)
Same Currency 0.876*** 0.391* 0.0389 0.105 0.0221 -0.0658
(0.205) (0.218) (0.194) (0.228) (0.245) (0.332)
Trust -2.114*** -1.453*** -1.579*** -1.911*** -0.435 -0.445
(0.427) (0.457) (0.515) (0.575) (0.525) (0.760)
Hierarchy -0.289 -1.305 0.636 -0.283 -3.412*** -0.704
(1.012) (1.227) (0.828) (1.154) (0.946) (1.355)
Individualism -1.948 0.874 1.170 1.761 1.118 -1.241
(1.284) (1.035) (0.739) (1.186) (1.229) (0.985)
Observations 1,823,844 1,827,855 1,701,168 1,790,195 1,790,144 1,610,370
R-squared 0.874 0.874 0.928 0.948 0.931 0.837
Origin NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS3 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Projects
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equations (2). The dependent variable is the number of projects
involving goods, services, and construction works procurement in columns (1) to (3). In columns (4) to (6) the
dependent variable is the total final value in million Euros. All specifications include origin and destination
NUTS3 region fixed effects. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-
White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Total Final Value (in Euros)
Table 4: Goods, Services, and Construction Works
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
same_NUTS0 5.367*** 4.892*** 4.618*** 4.682*** 4.977*** 4.545*** 4.488*** 4.506***
(0.0426) (0.0536) (0.0785) (0.0794) (0.0428) (0.0646) (0.106) (0.107)
same_NUTS1 0.244*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.258*** 0.481*** 0.488*** 0.489*** 0.492***
(0.0331) (0.0332) (0.0332) (0.0317) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0285)
same_NUTS2 0.916*** 0.921*** 0.924*** 0.826*** 0.964*** 0.972*** 0.977*** 0.950***
(0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0453) (0.0441) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0382)
Distance (log) -0.716*** -0.712*** -0.709*** -0.672*** -0.665*** -0.662***
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0199)
Same Language 0.787*** 0.760*** 0.792*** 0.924*** 0.922*** 0.929***
(0.0781) (0.0628) (0.0636) (0.106) (0.0962) (0.0965)
Same Currency 0.595*** 0.650*** 0.693*** 0.0871 0.0467 0.0602
(0.0962) (0.103) (0.102) (0.118) (0.131) (0.130)
Trust -1.699*** -1.831*** -1.249*** -1.291***
(0.249) (0.254) (0.372) (0.375)
Hierarchy 0.0541 -0.129 -0.683 -0.733
(0.674) (0.678) (0.658) (0.658)
Individualism -0.916 -0.927 1.090 1.084
(0.602) (0.600) (0.764) (0.764)
-0.879*** -0.649***
Distance by product category (log) (0.0317) (0.0273)
Commodities, food, fuels, and construction 
materials -0.687*** -0.465***
(0.0270) (0.0283)
Machinery and equipment -0.320*** -0.308***
(0.0311) (0.0418)
Medical products -0.643*** -0.542***
(0.0296) (0.0324)
Other manufacturing -1.109*** -0.782***
(0.0353) (0.0269)
Construction -0.963*** -0.764***
(0.0306) (0.0290)
Business, real estate, engineering, IT, and 
research services -1.129*** -0.772***
(0.0324) (0.0260)
Other services -1.093*** -0.814***
(0.0394) (0.0322)
Observations 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,763,495
R-squared 0.567 0.566 0.566 0.588 0.548 0.548 0.548 0.541
Origin NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 5: Results of the Extended Specification
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equation (3). The dependent variable is the number of projects in columns (1) to (4) and the total final value in million Euros in columns (5) to (8). All
specifications include origin and destination NUTS2 region fixed effects as well as year and product category fixed effects. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-
White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Number of Projects Total Final Value (in Euros)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 offer >1 offer 1 offer >1 offer 1 offer >1 offer 1 offer >1 offer
same_NUTS0 5.343*** 5.443*** 4.933*** 4.590*** 5.172*** 4.998*** 4.986*** 4.417***
(0.0662) (0.0453) (0.101) (0.104) (0.0785) (0.0473) (0.160) (0.143)
same_NUTS1 0.0247 0.297*** 0.0251 0.305*** 0.384*** 0.495*** 0.386*** 0.505***
(0.0557) (0.0323) (0.0557) (0.0323) (0.0485) (0.0290) (0.0485) (0.0289)
same_NUTS2 1.130*** 0.791*** 1.131*** 0.802*** 1.399*** 0.808*** 1.403*** 0.822***
(0.0846) (0.0421) (0.0847) (0.0422) (0.0649) (0.0376) (0.0650) (0.0377)
Distance (log) -0.666*** -0.730*** -0.665*** -0.720*** -0.391*** -0.737*** -0.388*** -0.725***
(0.0416) (0.0223) (0.0417) (0.0223) (0.0374) (0.0201) (0.0375) (0.0201)
Same Language 0.0534 0.911*** 0.323* 1.092***
(0.0877) (0.0752) (0.177) (0.116)
Same Currency 0.588*** 0.575*** -0.0969 -0.0137
(0.0972) (0.144) (0.172) (0.176)
Trust 0.186 -2.258*** -0.538 -1.426***
(0.255) (0.297) (0.533) (0.434)
Hierarchy -1.211** 0.482 -1.296 -0.808
(0.554) (0.833) (0.999) (0.796)
Individualism -1.724*** -1.183 0.500 1.147
(0.345) (0.794) (0.672) (0.930)
Observations 2,743,685 2,763,495 2,743,685 2,763,495 2,733,990 2,763,495 2,733,990 2,763,495
R-squared 0.620 0.540 0.620 0.540 0.582 0.504 0.582 0.504
Origin NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 6: Awards with One and Multiple Offers
Number of Projects Total Final Value (in Euros)
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equation (3). The dependent variable is the number of projects in columns (1) to (4)
and the total final value in million Euros in columns (5) to (8). All specifications include origin and destination NUTS2 region
fixed effects as well as year and product category fixed effects. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML). Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Percentile Value (in Euros)
25 4,337.0
50 33,238.1
75 200,340.4
95 1,879,134.5
99 11,074,326.0
Notes: Distribution of award values in the data set.
Table 7: Award Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile >=95 Percentile One Bidder
same_NUTS0 5.243*** 5.098*** 4.784*** 4.483*** 4.396***
(0.247) (0.177) (0.138) (0.127) (0.0992)
same_NUTS1 0.0232 -0.0184 0.218*** 0.503*** 0.507***
(0.0650) (0.0453) (0.0344) (0.0269) (0.0324)
same_NUTS2 0.985*** 0.838*** 1.072*** 1.044*** 0.905***
(0.119) (0.0616) (0.0478) (0.0403) (0.0408)
same_NUTS0
1st Quartile 6.162*** 6.129***
(0.134) (0.138)
2nd Quartile 5.608*** 5.692***
(0.115) (0.114)
3rd Quartile 4.904*** 4.933***
(0.100) (0.0967)
4th Quartile 4.148*** 3.946***
(0.0783) (0.0887)
same_NUTS1
1st Quartile -0.213*** -0.277***
(0.0808) (0.101)
2nd Quartile -0.0663 -0.214***
(0.0528) (0.0794)
3rd Quartile 0.278*** 0.0447
(0.0338) (0.0580)
4th Quartile 0.555*** 0.496***
(0.0345) (0.0532)
same_NUTS2
1st Quartile 0.908*** 1.276***
(0.104) (0.156)
2nd Quartile 0.933*** 1.016***
(0.0588) (0.0873)
3rd Quartile 1.023*** 1.192***
(0.0497) (0.0743)
4th Quartile 0.913*** 1.111***
(0.0547) (0.0807)
Distance (log) -0.391*** -0.688*** -0.801*** -0.668*** -0.601*** -0.696*** -0.659***
(0.0588) (0.0386) (0.0260) (0.0189) (0.0222) (0.0219) (0.0331)
Same Language 1.793*** 1.478*** 1.084*** 0.862*** 0.843*** 0.727*** 0.241***
(0.365) (0.177) (0.0992) (0.0725) (0.105) (0.0588) (0.0927)
Same Currency 1.939*** 0.727*** 0.260* 0.116 -0.0328 0.567*** 0.436***
(0.250) (0.225) (0.150) (0.133) (0.124) (0.106) (0.0892)
Trust -4.040*** -3.286*** -1.165*** -1.026*** -0.972*** -1.011*** 0.632**
(1.377) (0.824) (0.426) (0.377) (0.308) (0.255) (0.306)
Hierarchy 0.661 1.001 0.550 -0.529 -2.148*** 0.291 -1.203***
(1.349) (1.013) (0.768) (0.765) (0.557) (0.494) (0.457)
Individualism -12.30*** -3.735*** -0.159 1.512* 0.322 -0.969 -2.285***
(2.029) (1.409) (0.791) (0.826) (0.431) (0.659) (0.335)
Observations 2,532,075 2,685,200 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,753,590 11,053,980 10,935,960
R-squared 0.636 0.652 0.515 0.562 0.523 0.373 0.422
Origin NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Projects
Notes: Columns (1) to (5) show estimates of regression equation (3). The dependent variable is, respectively, the number of projects in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
and 4th quartile and above the 95 percentile of the distribution of the total final value of awards. Column (6) shows jointly estimated quartile-specific
border effects. In column (7) estimates for the subsample of awards with only one bidder are shown. All specifications include origin and destination
NUTS2 region fixed effects as well as year and product category fixed effects. Column (6) and (7) also include quartile fixed effects. The method of
estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML).  Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table 8: Border Effects by Total Final Value of the Award
CPV Division same_NUTS0 same_NUTS1 same_NUTS2 Distance (log)
77. Agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services 7.416 1.009 1.964 -1.039
(1.092) (0.159) -0.225 (0.169)
80. Education and training services 6.211 0.485 2.555 -0.755
(0.651) (0.156) -0.193 (0.111)
70. Real estate services 6.136 0.625 2.086 -0.716
(1.419) (0.208) -0.234 (0.145)
85. Health and social work services 5.448 1.027 2.334 -0.542
(0.583) (0.114) -0.134 (0.085)
41. Collected and purified water 6.308 0.370 1.73 -1.013
(1.385) (0.319) -0.389 (0.266)
9. Petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy 6.909 0.630 0.762 -0.740
(0.365) (0.094) -0.1 (0.066)
65. Public utilities 5.621 1.374 1.162 -0.572
(0.640) (0.169) -0.162 (0.123)
55. Hotel, restaurant and retail trade services 6.084 0.494 1.365 -0.828
(0.906) (0.157) -0.121 (0.110)
75. Administration, defence and social security services 4.653 1.222 1.876 -0.191
(0.523) (0.159) -0.182 (0.120)
60. Transport services (excl. Waste transport) 5.113 0.515 1.881 -1.356
(0.662) (0.126) -0.123 (0.092)
30. Office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies except furniture and software packages 5.006 0.481 1.588 -0.428
(0.340) (0.095) -0.132 (0.068)
63. Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services 4.860 0.628 1.57 -0.586
(0.835) (0.118) -0.148 (0.092)
66. Financial and insurance services 5.329 0.211 1.417 -0.445
(0.619) (0.101) -0.123 (0.057)
64. Postal and telecommunications services 6.116 0.611 0.199 -0.753
(0.764) (0.178) -0.221 (0.119)
14. Mining, basic metals and related products 4.487 0.645 1.267 -0.955
(0.592) (0.175) -0.184 (0.137)
50. Repair and maintenance services 4.699 0.355 1.332 -0.787
(0.677) (0.079) -0.096 (0.060)
22. Printed matter and related products 4.655 0.386 1.313 -0.369
(0.391) (0.104) -0.14 (0.060)
33. Medical equipments, pharmaceuticals and personal care products 6.063 0.002 0.243 -0.229
(0.776) (0.047) -0.069 (0.045)
98. Other community, social and personal services 4.558 0.553 1.103 -0.874
(0.609) (0.107) -0.106 (0.082)
16. Agricultural machinery 4.233 0.883 1.032 -0.962
(0.679) (0.161) -0.18 (0.132)
90. Sewage-, refuse-, cleaning-, and environmental services 4.351 0.662 1.12 -1.083
(0.486) (0.064) -0.078 (0.051)
32. Radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment 4.558 0.627 0.794 -0.502
(0.310) (0.070) -0.097 (0.055)
3. Agricultural, farming, fishing, forestry and related products 4.670 0.399 0.822 -1.116
(0.656) (0.131) -0.146 (0.082)
51. Installation services (except software) 4.551 0.544 0.749 -0.753
(0.761) (0.121) -0.137 (0.077)
79. Business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security 4.254 0.583 0.972 -0.545
(0.217) (0.067) -0.088 (0.053)
48. Software package and information systems 4.632 0.331 0.787 -0.281
(0.226) (0.063) -0.093 (0.044)
24. Chemical products 4.824 0.284 0.511 -0.468
(0.452) (0.099) -0.139 (0.075)
92. Recreational, cultural and sporting services 3.960 0.172 1.479 -0.712
(0.533) (0.113) -0.142 (0.103)
45. Construction work 3.688 0.729 1.166 -1.162
(0.151) (0.067) -0.083 (0.049)
73. Research and development services and related consultancy services 4.222 0.846 0.469 -0.333
(0.337) (0.127) -0.141 (0.089)
72. IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support 4.479 0.555 0.479 -0.490
(0.196) (0.064) -0.082 (0.043)
15. Food, beverages, tobacco and related products 4.800 0.582 -0.012 -1.349
(0.598) (0.118) -0.189 (0.084)
31. Electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; Lighting 4.276 0.420 0.645 -0.616
(0.218) (0.077) -0.095 (0.051)
18. Clothing, footwear, luggage articles and accessories 4.332 0.262 0.742 -0.561
(0.364) (0.090) -0.135 (0.067)
71. Architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services 3.692 0.756 0.751 -0.863
(0.190) (0.061) -0.074 (0.044)
38. Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (excl. glasses) 5.006 0.087 0.057 -0.460
(0.188) (0.076) -0.113 (0.047)
44. Construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction (excepts electric apparatus) 3.588 0.536 0.982 -0.756
(0.227) (0.067) -0.096 (0.047)
39. Furniture (incl. office furniture), furnishings, domestic appliances (excl. lighting) and cleaning products 3.624 0.436 0.808 -0.661
(0.202) (0.056) -0.084 (0.040)
37. Musical instruments, sport goods, games, toys, handicraft, art materials and accessories 3.705 0.427 0.678 -0.473
(0.492) (0.114) -0.161 (0.080)
35. Security, fire-fighting, police and defence equipment 3.870 0.026 0.804 -0.533
(0.340) (0.091) -0.133 (0.065)
34. Transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation 3.324 0.367 0.804 -0.730
(0.169) (0.065) -0.098 (0.046)
76. Services related to the oil and gas industry 4.141 -1.563 1.796 -0.916
(0.614) (0.341) -0.456 (0.184)
42. Industrial machinery 3.606 0.289 0.47 -0.693
(0.208) (0.073) -0.098 (0.049)
43. Machinery for mining, quarrying, construction equipment 2.911 0.440 0.66 -0.995
(0.500) (0.113) -0.122 (0.088)
19. Leather and textile fabrics, plastic and rubber materials 2.957 0.188 0.597 -0.466
(0.568) (0.137) -0.16 (0.089)
Table 9: Border Effects by Type of Procurement
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equations (3) for 45 CPV divisions which are sorted according to the total international border effect (i.e., the sum of the coefficients on the
three border dummies). The dependent variable is the number of projects. The regressions include origin and destination NUTS2 region fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. Controls
for same language, same currency, and cultural distance are included but not shown. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-White robust
standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lowest Price MEAT Open/Restr Lowest Price MEAT Open/Restr
same_NUTS0 5.344*** 3.930*** 4.677*** 4.784*** 4.257*** 4.555***
(0.180) (0.0656) (0.102) (0.208) (0.111) (0.149)
same_NUTS1 0.0620 0.464*** 0.213*** 0.419*** 0.494*** 0.472***
(0.0450) (0.0258) (0.0349) (0.0399) (0.0341) (0.0303)
same_NUTS2 0.761*** 1.148*** 0.897*** 0.674*** 1.224*** 0.950***
(0.0691) (0.0391) (0.0474) (0.0507) (0.0484) (0.0401)
Distance (log) -0.612*** -0.689*** -0.739*** -0.632*** -0.668*** -0.729***
(0.0400) (0.0186) (0.0244) (0.0287) (0.0244) (0.0212)
Same Language 0.589*** 1.148*** 0.905*** 0.804*** 0.848*** 1.232***
(0.110) (0.0608) (0.0708) (0.157) (0.117) (0.105)
Same Currency 0.268 0.639*** 0.696*** -0.272 0.354** -0.116
(0.204) (0.0922) (0.127) (0.223) (0.146) (0.163)
Trust -2.914*** -1.285*** -2.091*** -2.506*** -0.314 -1.494***
(0.360) (0.243) (0.307) (0.569) (0.370) (0.445)
Hierarchy 1.406 -1.566*** 0.716 -0.254 -1.553** -0.289
(0.941) (0.604) (0.806) (0.986) (0.705) (0.821)
Individualism -0.878 -0.654** -1.474* 1.276 0.432 1.499*
(1.172) (0.297) (0.757) (1.189) (0.533) (0.868)
Observations 2,734,130 2,763,495 2,763,495 2,724,400 2,763,495 2,763,495
R-squared 0.696 0.652 0.550 0.431 0.641 0.547
Origin NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Destination NUTS2 FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Product Category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equation (3). In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variable is the number of
projects that were tendered according to the "lowest price" and "MEAT" criterion and projects for which the "open" or
"restricted" procedure was used. In columns (4) to (6) projects are weighted by their total final value in million Euros. All
specifications include origin and destination NUTS2 region fixed effects as well as year and product category fixed effects.
The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Eicker-White robust standard errors are shown in
parantheses.
Number of Projects
Table 10: Award Criteria and Type of Procedure
Total Final Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
All 0.97 49.30 0.00 28,388.00
Goods 0.53 32.85 0.00 18,964.00
Services 0.33 17.58 0.00 10,438.00
Construction Works 0.10 6.82 0.00 4,364.00
By Award Value
1st Quartile 0.17 14.25 0.00 8,022.00
2nd Quartile 0.17 11.96 0.00 8,028.00
3rd Quartile 0.17 10.33 0.00 7,004.00
4th Quartile 0.17 10.64 0.00 7,001.00
By Number of Offers
Only One Bidder 0.21 17.02 0.00 14,232.00
More than One Bidder 0.63 32.20 0.00 18,273.00
By Award Criterion
Lowest Price 0.46 34.23 0.00 20,978.00
MEAT 0.43 21.20 0.00 10,579.00
By Type of Procedure
Open/Restricted 0.86 44.27 0.00 26,058.00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
All 0.22 13.88 0.00 8,152.11
Goods 0.07 5.54 0.00 3,184.01
Services 0.08 6.23 0.00 4,198.79
Construction Works 0.07 3.64 0.00 1,686.94
By Number of Offers
Only One Bidder 0.04 4.05 0.00 3,126.81
More than One Bidder 0.16 9.73 0.00 5,214.83
By Award Criterion
Lowest Price 0.10 8.28 0.00 5,219.63
MEAT 0.11 6.68 0.00 4,762.93
By Type of Procedure
Open/Restricted 0.18 10.62 0.00 6,387.70
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
same_NUTS0 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS1 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS2 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS3 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
Distance, in 1000km 1.14 0.89 0.00 13.42
Distance (log) -0.13 0.79 -6.60 2.60
Same Language 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Same Currency 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Cultural values
Trust 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.51
Hierarchy 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.39
Individualism 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.37
Notes:  Descriptive statistics are shown. The number of observations is 1,792,217.
Table A1:  Data Set on NUTS3 Level
Panel A: Number of Projects
Panel B: Total Final Value, in Million Euros
Panel C: Other Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
All 0.64 20.94 0.00 5,990.00
Goods 0.35 16.16 0.00 5,990.00
Services 0.22 11.86 0.00 5,572.00
Construction Works 0.07 6.06 0.00 2,853.00
By Award Value
1st Quartile 0.11 8.38 0.00 4,159.00
2nd Quartile 0.11 5.25 0.00 1,816.00
3rd Quartile 0.11 3.99 0.00 970.00
4th Quartile 0.11 3.68 0.00 1,097.00
By Number of Offers
Only One Bidder 0.14 7.97 0.00 3,916.00
More than One Bidder 0.42 13.43 0.00 5,047.00
By Award Criterion
Lowest Price 0.31 15.36 0.00 5,964.00
MEAT 0.29 9.73 0.00 3,469.00
By Type of Procedure
Open/Restricted 0.57 19.23 0.00 5,987.00
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
All 0.15 4.93 0.00 2,828.71
Goods 0.05 1.88 0.00 537.06
Services 0.05 3.35 0.00 2,828.71
Construction Works 0.05 3.09 0.00 1,869.09
By Number of Offers
Only One Bidder 0.03 1.18 0.00 496.01
More than One Bidder 0.11 3.80 0.00 2,789.91
By Award Criterion
Lowest Price 0.06 2.69 0.00 2,415.62
MEAT 0.07 3.21 0.00 1,707.75
By Type of Procedure
Open/Restricted 0.12 3.94 0.00 1,614.38
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean sd min max
same_NUTS0 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS1 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
same_NUTS2 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00
Distance, in 1000km 1.47 1.42 0.00 13.42
Distance (log) 0.07 0.82 -6.60 2.60
Same Language 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
Same Currency 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Cultural values
Trust 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.51
Hierarchy 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.39
Individualism 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.37
Notes:  Descriptive statistics are shown. The number of observations is 2,803,115.
Table A2: Data Set on NUTS2 Level
Panel A: Number of Projects
Panel B: Total Final Value, in Million Euros
Panel C: Other Variables
(1) (2)
Number of Projects Total Final Value
same_NUTS0 4.654*** 4.607***
(0.0975) (0.133)
Year 2011 0.0162 -0.101
(0.0708) (0.0804)
Year 2012 0.0671 -0.0714
(0.0730) (0.0856)
Year 2013 -0.114 -0.147*
(0.0823) (0.0822)
Year 2014 -0.169 -0.303**
(0.111) (0.151)
same_NUTS1 0.247*** 0.432***
(0.0651) (0.0473)
Year 2011 -0.0442 -0.0107
(0.0840) (0.0584)
Year 2012 0.000324 0.0661
(0.0870) (0.0639)
Year 2013 0.0284 0.132*
(0.0893) (0.0757)
Year 2014 0.0343 0.107
(0.101) (0.0692)
same_NUTS2 0.983*** 1.051***
(0.0790) (0.0645)
Year 2011 0.0287 0.0860
(0.0950) (0.0933)
Year 2012 -0.00193 -0.0935
(0.100) (0.0875)
Year 2013 -0.142 -0.204**
(0.0979) (0.0934)
Year 2014 -0.233** -0.203**
(0.109) (0.0888)
Distance (log) -0.709*** -0.662***
(0.0228) (0.0199)
Same Language 0.760*** 0.922***
(0.0628) (0.0962)
Same Currency 0.650*** 0.0467
(0.103) (0.131)
Trust -1.699*** -1.249***
(0.249) (0.372)
Hierarchy 0.0541 -0.683
(0.674) (0.658)
Individualism -0.916 1.090
(0.602) (0.763)
Observations 2,763,495 2,763,495
R-squared 0.567 0.551
Origin NUTS2 FE YES YES
Destination NUTS2 FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Product Category FE YES YES
Notes: The table shows estimates of regression equation (3) that has been
extended to include additional interactions to allow border effects to vary by year.
The dependent variable is the number of projects in column (1) and the total final
value in million Euros in column (2). All specifications include origin and
destination NUTS2 region fixed effects as well as year and product category
fixed effects. The method of estimation is Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML). Eicker-White robust standard errors  are shown in parantheses.
Table A3: Border Effects Over Time
CPV Division (45) Product Categories (7) Goods, Services, 
Construction works (3)
3 Agricultural, farming, fishing, forestry and related products
9 Petroleum products, fuel, electricity and other sources of energy
14 Mining, basic metals and related products
15 Food, beverages, tobacco and related products
24 Chemical products
41 Collected and purified water
44 Construction structures and materials; auxiliary products to construction (excepts electric apparatus)
16 Agricultural machinery
30 Office and computing machinery, equipment and supplies except furniture and software packages
31 Electrical machinery, apparatus, equipment and consumables; Lighting
32 Radio, television, communication, telecommunication and related equipment
34 Transport equipment and auxiliary products to transportation
35 Security, fire-fighting, police and defence equipment
38 Laboratory, optical and precision equipments (excl. glasses)
42 Industrial machinery
43 Machinery for mining, quarrying, construction equipment
33 Medical equipments, pharmaceuticals and personal care products Medical products
18 Clothing, footwear, luggage articles and accessories
19 Leather and textile fabrics, plastic and rubber materials
22 Printed matter and related products
37 Musical instruments, sport goods, games, toys, handicraft, art materials and accessories
39 Furniture (incl. office furniture), furnishings, domestic appliances (excl. lighting) and cleaning products
48 Software package and information systems
45 Construction work Construction Construction works
66 Financial and insurance services
70 Real estate services
71 Architectural, construction, engineering and inspection services
72 IT services: consulting, software development, Internet and support
73 Research and development services and related consultancy services
79 Business services: law, marketing, consulting, recruitment, printing and security
50 Repair and maintenance services
51 Installation services (except software)
55 Hotel, restaurant and retail trade services
60 Transport services (excl. Waste transport)
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agencies services
64 Postal and telecommunications services
65 Public utilities
75 Administration, defence and social security services
76 Services related to the oil and gas industry
77 Agricultural, forestry, horticultural, aquacultural and apicultural services
80 Education and training services
85 Health and social work services
90 Sewage-, refuse-, cleaning-, and environmental services
92 Recreational, cultural and sporting services
98 Other community, social and personal services
Notes: The table compares the three classifications that we use for the type of procurement in the paper: i) 45 CPV Divisions, ii) seven broad product categories, iii) goods, services, and construction works.
Table A4: CPV Divisions
GoodsMachinery and equipment
Services
Other services
Business, real estate, engineering, IT, and research services
Other manufacturing
Commodities, food, fuels, and construction materials
